




Lack of Social Position



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One of the claims that the MKO makes in order to gain political and financial support against the Western authorities is the claim of having the support of the majority of the Iranian people, which remains only to the extent of the same claim, because the Iranian people know them and not supporting them at all. This is despite the fact that the lack of support of the Iranian people for this group is so obvious that Western officials have repeatedly acknowledged it.

MKO and Lack of Social Position

One of the claims that the MKO makes in order to gain political and financial support against the Western authorities is the claim of having the support of the majority of the Iranian people, which is false because the Iranian people know them and do not support them at all. This is despite the fact that the lack of support of the Iranian people for this group is so obvious that Western officials have repeatedly acknowledged it. The main reason for the Iranian people's hatred of MKO can be discussed under the following axis:

1. Terrorist operations: In the early years of the Islamic Revolution, the MKO began blind assassinations throughout Iran, especially in Tehran. During this period, they assassinated businessmen, students, teachers, etc., for reasons such as attending mosques, installing a photo of Ayatollah Khomeini in their shop, wearing a beard, and so on. Many Iranians lost a number of relatives, friends, and acquaintances in this way. The assassinations continued in various forms, such as bombings and mortar shells. Therefore, the Iranian people see the MKO as a criminal and a terrorist organization.

2. Iran-Iraq War: After the start of the Iran-Iraq War, the MKO went to Iraq; from there it not only assisted in attacks and espionage to Saddam's regime but also helped in operations such as its "Forough Javidan" on behalf of Saddam and attacked Iranian soil. Therefore, the Iranian people look at MKO members as traitors.

3. Suppression of Opposition and Destruction of Critics: MKO, with its sectarian structure, not only minimizes internal dissent but also suppresses any dissent among its members through various means such as torture, solitary confinement, and physical removal. In addition, not only does it reject any criticism, but it also opens its collective mouth to insult the critic. Anyone who publishes a critique or article in opposition to the MKO will quickly be given the title of mercenary and spy by the MKO. The MKO has used this behavior against its dissident members, other oppositions, and foreign figures. Hence, the Iranian people consider them irrational and dictatorial.

In May 2011, the US State Department states:

All Iranians queried tended to disbelieve the MEK's expressed allegiance to the ideals of human rights and democracy.

They express severe dislike for this group, primarily due to its alliance with Saddam Hussein during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.

Showing a unanimity rare among Iranians, anecdotal information gleaned from both ordinary Iranians living inside Iran and abroad and from Iran analysts strongly indicates that the 'Mujahedin-e Khalq' (MEK) opposition group has not significant popular support inside Iran.

It is more a cult of personality centered on a leadership unchanged since 1979 than a popular-based political movement.

Even hardened Iranian oppositionists and persecuted religious minorities such as the Iranian Baha'i saying they would prefer the current Iranian government to an MEK-affiliated one.

It is worth noting that increasing American support for the MEK is a step that the Bush administration even at the height of its openly hostile Iran policy wasn't willing to take.

The most prominent international human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have determined the MEK to be undemocratic, with a cult-like organizational structure.

It seems to be the case that any increased show of USG support for this group will not help the cause of freedom and democracy in Iran, but will only adversely impact popular perceptions of the USG among ordinary Iranians.

Ref: US State Department report, 2011, section (Summary) and Line (3)

4. Duplicity: The history of the MKO shows that it only cares about its own interests at any given time and also adjusts its appearance to further its interests. In other words, what is visible in the outer shell of the group is not consistent with the nature and inside of the group. For example, since the group's inception, leaders have hidden their Marxist tendencies, despite their belief in Marxist ideology and the teaching of Marxist books to members of the group. Due to their need for funding from Islamic scholars and their lack of public acceptance of Marxism, they show themselves to be believers in Islam, and all this duplicitous behavior is to attract more audiences. After the Islamic Revolution, when the Islamists entered the parliament and the government in all the elections due to the widespread acceptance of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamists by the people, the Mojahedin showed themselves to be in favor of the Islamic Revolution. But behind the scenes, they sought to collect weapons and seize the government in order to oust the Islamists from within and take over the leadership of the government themselves. After the removal of Bani Sadr by the parliament, their way of influencing the government was blocked, and they started a public struggle against Iran. But because of the need for Western support to fight the Iranian government, despite their "anti-imperialist" and especially anti-American positions during the Shah era and also in the early years after the Islamic Revolution, they appear to be pro-Western; they acted publically unlike the internal dictatorship of Maryam and Massoud Rajavi. At this point, by their uncritical behavior towards external critics, they presented themselves to be pro-democracy. The mismatch between appearance and behavior in the MKO is so clear to the Iranian people that MKO is called "hypocrites" or "two-faced". This has made people distrust this group.

5. Being opposed to Iran: The MKO, and especially the NCRI (its political branch), always try to increase the severity of sanctions against Iran by mixing false information with correct information and spending a lot of money in their lobbying. This is while the effects of these sanctions affect the lives of ordinary people more. Hence, as people's lives become more difficult, their hatred towards MKO increases.

The reason why Iranian people hate MKO



1

Terrorist operations

In the early years of the Islamic Revolution, the MKO began blind assassinations (businessmen, students, teachers, etc.)

2

Iran–Iraq War

Help to Saddam's regime in attacks and espionage, in operations such as "Forough Javidan" on behalf of Saddam attacked to Iranian soil.



3

Suppression of Opposition

it suppresses dissents through means such as torture, solitary confinement and... destruction of critics by given the title of mercenary, spy and...

4



Duplicity

what is visible in the outer shell of the group is not consistent with the nature and inside the group. MKO shows that it only cares about its own interests at any given time and also adjusts its appearance to further their interests.

5

Being opposite to Iran

Try to increase the severity of sanctions against Iran by mixing false information with correct information and spending a lot of money in their lobbying.



Lack of Social Base in International Statements and Reports

Here are some of the statements and reports of Western institutions and personalities in this regard:

In May 2011, the US State Department released a report entitled "Iran's people tendencies against the MEK" in which it analyzed the MKO's popularity among Iranians inside the country and abroad. Excerpts from this report are as follows:

The following cable is based on input from State Department Iran-watchers and consular interviewing officers in the main posts that interact with Iranians on a regular basis, i.e. ANKARA, BAKU, BERLIN, DUBAI, and ISTANBUL.¹

- Showing a unanimity rare among Iranians, anecdotal information gleaned from both ordinary Iranians living inside Iran and abroad and from Iran analysts strongly indicates that the 'Mujahedin-e Khalq' (MEK) opposition group has no significant popular support inside Iran. ... They express severe dislike for this group, primarily due to its alliance with Saddam Hussein during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. All Iranians queried tended to disbelieve the MEK's expressed allegiance to the ideals of human rights and democracy, with even hardened Iranian oppositionists and persecuted religious minorities such as the Iranian Baha'i saying they would prefer the current Iranian government to a MEK-affiliated one.²

- Currently, MEK supporters claim the group has renounced violence as a tool and seeks a secular, democratic Iran, while its detractors claim it is more a cult of personality centred on a leadership unchanged since 1979 than a popular-based political movement.³

- And the group leader tries to enslave members and educate them about their goals and desires, which were more personal. In speaking to hundreds of Iranians both in the preceding two months and before, ... Among younger Iranians (i.e. most of the population) this lack of support was derived from both the MEK's 'treasonous acts' in supporting Iraq during the war and also from a near-total lack of information due to the absence of any MEK influence inside Iran.⁴

1 US State Department report, 2011, Line (1)

2 Same, section (Summary)

3 Same, Line (3)

4 Same, Line (5)

•Regardless of whether the USG deems it a terrorist organization, the MEK lacks any significant popular support in Iran, and to the extent, Iranians know about this group they are far more likely to oppose it than support it. Indeed it seems to be the case that any increased show of USG support for this group will not help the cause of freedom and democracy in Iran, but will only adversely impact popular perceptions of the USG among ordinary Iranians, and could also strengthen support for Ahmadinejad and other hardliners.⁵

Lack of Social Position in the International Reports and Statements

In May 2011, the US State Department released a report entitled "Iran's people tendencies against the MEK" in which it analyzed the MKO's popularity among Iranians at inside the country and abroad.

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Ref: US State Department report, 2011, Line (1)

5 Same, Line (9)

•Political analysts focused on contemporary Iran, all of whom were Iranian by birth. Without exception, these analysts said that the MEK lacked any significant popular support inside Iran, with Iranian popular reactions to the MEK varying from rank ignorance (mostly among the young) to extreme aversion (to those more familiar with their history).⁶

The following direct quotes from prominent analysts of contemporary Iran, reflect the feedback received:

•The most prominent international human rights organizations-- including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International -- have determined the MEK to be undemocratic, with a cult-like organizational structure and modus operandi that belies its claim to be a vehicle for democratic change. ...

•When Iran's (2009) post-election turbulence commenced, the MEK quickly sought to join the frenzy of brewing opposition to the current government inside Iran. But by claiming links to this indigenous opposition, the MEK connected their name to genuinely disenfranchised voters.

•Increased U.S. government support for the MEK will empower Ahmadinejad and other hardliners in Iran, thereby increasing their (Ahmadinejad and the other hardliners) overall domestic support exponentially.

•It will significantly reduce any chance of real rapprochement with the Iranian government, and severely curtail indigenous democratic progress in Iran. The Iranian people won't forgive or forget this -- particularly given the history surrounding U.S. policies toward Mossadegh and the Shah. And this is one of the cardinal sins poisoning U.S. – Iran relations to this day. It is worth noting that increasing American support for the MEK is a step that the Bush administration—even at the height of its openly hostile Iran policy -- wasn't willing to take. Even they understood that increased support for the MEK will exacerbate all of the challenges and problems that Iran policy currently poses to the USG. ... They would assume that the U.S. intentions are not to promote freedom and democracy in Iran, but simply to spoil the country.⁷

6 Same, Line (7)

7 Same, Line (8)



The 2012 Supreme Court
verdict also refers to the MKO:

The MKO's history of
terrorist violence and its
involvement in the
Iran-Iraq war, has made it
unpopular with the
general population of
Iran, even among the
anti-regime, protest-
ing and opposition
organizations.

Ref: the verdict of Supreme Court of England, 2012, P 4 & 5



Ambassador John Limbert (former US State Department official) who was part of the US hostages, states in a 2012 interview:

The MEK was carrying on an assassination campaign including the ruling party in June 1981. [They] killed about 80 people including some very prominent clerical leaders. One of the things that many Iranians will never forgive them for; fighting as an ally of Saddam Hussein against their homeland.



Ref: the BBC World Service's report, April 7, 2012, P2

of Iran, even among the anti-regime, protesting and opposition organizations of the Green Movement, which it is well known, for example, has publicly distanced itself from any involvement in it.⁸

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8 the verdict of Supreme Court of England, 2012, PP 4-5

9 the BBC World Service's report, April 7, 2012, P2

10 Same, P1

IN THE RAND REPORT MENTIONED THAT:

An American journalist reports that Iranians whom she interviewed likened the MeK to the Khmer Rouge and the Branch Davidian cult in Waco, Texas, comparisons that have also been made by current and former U.S. officials.

In reality it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded.

Ref: RAND Report, 2009, Page 77

In the RAND report, it was mentioned that:

"An American journalist reports that Iranians whom she interviewed likened the MeK to the Khmer Rouge and the Branch Davidian cult in Waco, Texas, comparisons that have also been made by current and former U.S. officials. Of course, as noted earlier, the MEK's decision to align itself with Saddam against the IRI and to kill Iranian conscripts during the brutal Iran-Iraq War greatly eroded its popular support in Iran. Although the MEK repeatedly claims to be the most influential opposition group in that country, in reality, it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded."¹¹

•"The MKO is a dishonest and creepy sect that is hated by the Iranian people," said Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon adviser, and researcher at the American Enterprise Institute.¹²

¹¹ RAND report, 2009, P77

¹² the website of Commentary Magazine <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/07/07/yes-mujahedin-al-khalq-is-a-dishonest-cult/>


Senator Goulet writes in her book: In September 1981, Iran is invaded by Iraq¹³. Massoud Rajavi, who had been a refugee in France since 1981, decided to respond positively¹⁴ to Saddam Hussein's offer of cooperation throughout the eight-year war. [For this reason, the Iranian people] consider the Mojahedin as traitors to the country, which, of course, is not surprising. 500,000 Iranians were killed in this war and at the same time, the influence of the Mojahedin among the people was drastically reduced ... After eight years of war, a ceasefire is finally established between the two countries, but Massoud decided to continue the war and on July 25, 1988, it launched operation "Forough Javidan". The operation resulted in a catastrophic defeat, in which between one-third and one-quarter of the Mojahedin got killed. ... Anne Singleton also stated that in January 2001, about 50 members of the organization were exchanged for Iraqi prisoners of war in Iran.¹⁵

Senator Goulet writes in her book:



[For this reason, the Iranian people] consider the Mojahedin as traitors to the country, which, of course, is not surprising. 500,000 Iranians were killed in this war and at the same time, the influence of the Mojahedin among the people was drastically reduced.

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Ref: Nathalie Goulet, Book "PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party", page 22 & 29

13 the book (PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party) Nathalie Goulet, 2013, P22

14 Same, P22

15 Same, P29

In this regard, the US State Department's 1994 report on the Iranian people's alleged support for the MKO states: This claim is much disputed by academics and other specialists on Iran, who assert that in fact, the Mojahedin-e Khalq have little support among Iranians. They argue that the Mojahedin's activities since the group's leadership fled from Iran in 1981-- particularly their alliance with Iraq and the group's internal oppression -- have discredited them among the Iranian polity.¹⁶ ... Among most experts -- whose work responsibilities require travel to Iran, discussions with Iranian expatriates, and acquaintance with the Mojahedin --there exists a singular consensus that the Mojahedin have negligible support among Iranians.¹⁷



16 State Department Report, 1994, the section "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"


17 Same, the section "STRUCTURE"



Barbara Slavin (Senior Correspondent for USA Today) also spoke at a conference on "US political elections against the Islamic Republic of Iran" in Washington, attended by about 10 former US political and military officials, regarding the use of the MKO as an effective opposition group to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated:

I was in Iran last week. When I talked to each Iranian about this group, they all hated them. If the United States wants to heed such an offer, the Iranians will reject it and no one will accompany the United States.

Ref: USA Today newspaper, 2005/04/14



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She also wrote in an article in USA Today: "Of more than 50 people interviewed about the MEK during a recent visit to Iran, only one had anything positive to say about it."¹⁸

Kenneth M. Pollack (Senior Research Fellow and the Head of Middle East Policy Center in Brookings Institution) stated that the MEK, as best I can tell, [inaudible] on the intelligence community, has very little support inside of Iran. While it is true that in the late 1970s and the early 1980s they did have a degree of support in Iran, they horribly de-legitimized themselves by throwing in their lot with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.¹⁹

¹⁸ USA Today newspaper, 2005/04/14

¹⁹ Council of Foreign Relations <http://www.cfr.org/world/transition-2005-us-policy-toward-iran/p7605>

A portrait of Kenneth M. Pollack, a middle-aged man with short, graying hair and glasses. He is wearing a blue button-down shirt under a brown textured blazer. He is looking directly at the camera with a neutral expression.

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Ms. Lilli Gruber, who is Italy's representative in the European Parliament and a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Foreign Relations, also writes in her book "Chador in the Torn Heart of Iran" in an article entitled "Cyanide Pills" wrote:

MKO have no place among the Iranian people. The alliance with Saddam during the war and the role of the "mercenaries" of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq wiped out the rest of their popularity forever. Unlike societies or groups such as the Kurds and the Northern Alliance used by the United States in Iraq, the Mojahedin are highly isolated, have no social base, and have no support network to assist them in their sabotage operations.

Ref: Gruber, Lilli, Chador in the Torn Heart of Iran, Chapter 5, Cyanide Pills

18 USA Today newspaper, 2005/04/14

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20 Gruber, Lilli, Chador in the Torn Heart of Iran, Chapter 5, Cyanide Pills

Mrs. Phyllis Starkey (Chair of the Inter-Party Group in the British Parliament) also attended a meeting of the NCRI in the House of Commons on 2005/10/12, seeing the false claims of NCRI members in the presence of Kim Howells (a senior British Foreign Office official) Stated: It is a sect, not a political party, and has virtually no support in Iran. It is a diversion from the real issues. ²¹ Senator Goulet, a member of the French parliament, also writes in her book: "In the protests that took place in Iran in 2009, the Mojahedin had practically no role. There was never a picture of Maryam or Massoud Rajavi in the hands of the demonstrators and no one in the streets shouted slogans in support of them (no picture of Massoud or Maryam Rajavi was seen). In all sites affiliated with the Mojahedin Organization, only one film with the lowest quality can be seen from the demonstration, which was most likely taken with a mobile phone, and in it, a large portrait of Massoud Rajavi can be seen in an unknown place, which is apparently Iran..."²²

21 the website of British Parliament <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051011/halltext/51011h01.htm>

22 the book (PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party) Nathalie Goulet, 2013, PP17 and 18

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MKO unacceptability among the opposition

It is noteworthy that the MKO not only has no support among the people but also has no place among other opposition groups, despite spending a lot of money and extensive activities abroad. The negative positions of the Iranian opposition inside and outside the country towards this group reflect this issue.

One of the reasons for the opposition of Iranian elements and groups to the MKO is due to its totalitarianism in dealing with others and its opponents. The NCRI, for example, which is now known as the political branch of the MKO, was not like that from the beginning, and several other parties were initially involved in the NCRI. But over time, due to the totalitarian tendencies of the MKO, they gradually withdrew from it, and thus this council has apparently become the political branch of the MKO.

The State Department report, in this regard states:

"Once a bona fide coalition, the Council disintegrated in the 1980s, when many of the resistance groups that had joined in 1981 left the organization because of their objections to Rajavi's dictatorial methods and his unilateral decision to ally with Iraq."²³

In her book on the formation and transformation of this council, Senator Goulet says:

"Massoud Rajavi fled Iran²⁴ with Bani-Sadr, who was ousted from the presidency on June 21, 1981 ... The two formed the National Council of Resistance in France with the Democratic Party."²⁵

"Following Massoud's decision to join Saddam's army in the Iran-Iraq war, the National Council of Resistance virtually dissolved because Bani Sadr and the Kurdistan Democratic Party seceded from it and refused to join. Massoud is also divorcing his wife, Firoozeh, the daughter of Bani Sadr, whom he had chosen as his wife a year ago."²⁶

23 the State Department report, 1994, section (THREE IN ONE: MKO/NCRI/NLA)

24 the book (PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party), Nathalie Goulet, 2013, P21

25 Same, P22

26 Same, P23

She goes on to discuss the current nature of the council and says:

"The organization is still trying to position itself as the only Iranian opposition group²⁷ It has a political showcase called the 'National' Council of Resistance, which bears only the name "National" and no one from any organization except the Mojahedin are in this group, and its members are people who have been brainwashed. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and also Abul Hassan Bani Sadr, who founded the council in the 1980s, are no longer members. This method, of course, is old and has been used in the past by various groups, including the "Khmer Rouge", of which only the Communists were members of the National Liberation Front. The Mojahedin also has an army called the National Liberation Army, which was formed in Iraq in 1987 to fight Iranian forces. The budget, facilities, and weapons of this army were given by Saddam Hussein."²⁸

THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, ON MEK LACK OF SOCIAL POSITION AMONG OPPOSITIONS:

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Ref: The State Department Report, 1994, Section (THREE IN ONE: MKO/NCR/NLA)

27 Same, P74

28 Same, P50

Hamid Reza Chitgar (known as Hamid Bahmani), the representative of the Iranian Labor Party in the NCRI, stated the main reason for his party's resignation: "The MKO's internal ideological revolution and the transfer of leadership from the NCRI to the MKO are the reasons for this resignation."²⁹

Mehdi Khan Baba Tehrani, a representative of the National Left Front for Democracy and Independence, also explained the reason for his party's withdrawal from the NCRI: "The policy of the NCRI has been to eliminate progressive and national forces and figures instead of recruiting them. The United Left Council within the NCRI is confronted with non-democratic relations and baseless local principles, and here the question arises as to whether we wanted to build the future of a country with those who do not tolerate the slightest opposition."³⁰

"The MKO opposes the expansion of the NCRI. When they entered into an agreement with a person or organization that they were confident that the new member within the NCRI would follow MKO policies, they used the NCRI name only to further MKO purposes." "The Kurdistan Democrat Party of Iran" said in a statement withdrawing from the NCRI.³¹

Another reason for the opposition's hatred of the MKO is that anyone who does not agree with the MKO leaders is insulted and threatened by the MKO, and labeled "mercenary, spy, etc." For example, Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the MKO, states in a pamphlet that all the opposition are all practical allies of the regime. "Look at non-MKO and non-NCRI, look at all the opponents of the resistance, because they do not rely on the people, they do not have violent struggle and the NLA, and they have become a bunch of idle people who have wasted their time and life and are in alliance with the regime against the resistance."³² " He also wrote about his critics in the organization's official publication: "Hollow Semi alternatives are faced with the decadence of personality and telling nonsense, dispersing garbage and have feckless analysis and commentaries about the positions and actions of MEK and NCRI."³³

29 Rastgoo, Ali, (Mojahedin in the mirror of history), Arnhem, The Netherlands, pp. 325, 326 and 329

30 Same, P346

31 Same

32 The book (New Al-Qaeda in Europe), David Gethin, 2012, P107, According to: Rajavi, Massoud, Situation Analysis, p.68

33 Same, P110, According to: Mojahed magazine, Number 341, PP1-2


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
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Rastgoo, Ali, (Mojahedin in the mirror of history), Arnhem, The Netherlands, p346

Senator Goulet writes in her book:

"The organization continues to name itself as the only Iranian opposition group, while no one mentioned the group during the 2009 protests; in this regard, the organization does not spare even the exposing opponents of the Islamic Republic from its verbal attacks, such as Shirin Ebadi. ³⁴

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Ref: Nathalie Goulet, Book "PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party", page 74

34 the book (PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party) Nathalie Goulet, 2013, P74

the website of Iran Resist (www.iranresist.org), one of the Mojahedin cover sites, has attacked Ms. Shirin Ebadi and Mr. Abdolkarim Lahiji by mentioning their names and has not only titled her article "Iran Resists Accused" but also openly declared that "Iran Resist site does not give the right to answer for the names mentioned". The same site claims that "Reporters without Borders" has become the headquarters of Imam Khomeini's base of IRGC that dressed as opposition journalists.³⁵ And these claims are while they themselves have started to present baseless lies to question the Islamic Republic of Iran.

MKO always pursues a "with us or against us" policy. The following are other examples of insults to other Iranian oppositions that have been published in the official MKO publications: "Banisadr³⁶ has exceeded the mullahs by shamefully disregarding human rights and the principles of political asylum. The role of Banisadr is to sharpen the knife of the merciless regime on the throat of Mujahedins and strugglers."³⁷

"Alireza Nourizadeh³⁸ , an anonymous highbrow element, who greets and shakes to anyone who throws a bone at him. Licking bowl mercenary, hired mercenary, waggery maker against Mojahedin"³⁹

35 Same, P65

36 The ousted president of Iran, who fled to France with Massoud Rajavi (MKO leader). He founded NCRI with the help of Massoud Rajavi. Massoud Rajavi took advantage of Bani Sadr's position and married his daughter. But Bani Sadr left the NCRI and Rajavi, who no longer saw any use for Bani Sadr's daughter, divorced her.

37 The book (New Al-Qaeda in Europe), David Gethin, 2012, P107, According to: Mojahed magazine, Number 320, P 23group

38 One of the oppositions that live abroad

39 Mojahed magazine, number 321, P13

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"Nimrouz and Kayhan of London newspapers are torn apart pages remaining from SAVAK of the Shah. They should be called lie dispersing and mean papers."

Ref: Mojahed magazine, Number 39, P10 & 13

-One of the oppositions that live abroad

-Mojahed magazine, number 321, P13

-One of the foreign opposition's publication

-The book (New Al-Qaeda in Europe), David Gethin, 2012, P107, According to: Mojahed magazine, Number 320, P23

MKO always pursues a “With us or against us” policy. The following are other examples of insults to other Iranian oppositions that have been published in the official MKO publications:

“Reza Pahlavi, the retarded son of the defunct Shah and idiot, who in the past his hated father was telling lies against MEK.”

“Raheh Karegar is a reactionary gathering from garbage dispersion and bites the legs of MEK and NCRI.”

“Bazargan and his business like company shareholders have an anti-nationalist identity. There is no such political organization by the name of Freedom Movement anymore in Iran. Everybody has left the Movement and only Bazargan and his likes Ebrahim Yazdi have remained. They are bunch of dispersed individuals who are evermore demising and vanishing.”

Ref: The book (New Al-Qaeda in Europe), David Gethin, 2012, P108, According to:
Mojahed magazine, number 299, NCRI notification
according to: Mojahed magazine, Number 327
according to: Mojahed magazine, number 353, P11

"Bazargan and his business-like company shareholders have an anti-nationalist identity. There is no such political organization by the name of the Freedom Movement anymore in Iran. Everybody has left the Movement and only Bazargan⁴⁰ and his likes Ebrahim Yazdi have remained. They are a bunch of dispersed individuals who are evermore demising and vanishing."⁴¹

"Nimrouz and Kayhan of London⁴² newspapers are torn apart pages remaining from SAVAK of the Shah. They should be called lie dispersing and mean papers."⁴³

"Raheh Karegar⁴⁴ is a reactionary gathering from garbage dispersion and bites the legs of MEK and NCRI."⁴⁵

"Reza Pahlavi,⁴⁶ the retarded son of the defunct Shah and idiot, who in the past his hated father was telling lies against MEK."⁴⁷

When MKO sees that they have no way, they commit to obscenity and want to show their hatred towards individuals.

40 Iran's first prime minister after the 1979 revolution and leader of "Nehzate Azadi" opposition group

41 The book (New Al-Qaeda in Europe), David Gethin, 2012, P108, According to: Mojahed magazine, number 299, NCRI notification

42 One of the foreign opposition's publication

43 Same, P109, according to: Mojahed magazine, Number 39, PP10-13

44 One of the abroad oppositions

45 Same, P110, according to: Mojahed magazine, Number 327

46 Son of former Shah of Iran that lives in USA now.

47 Same, P108, according to: Mojahed magazine, number 353, P11

Fans and Membership

The question that arises here is that, if the Mojahedin does not have the support of the people, first of all, where do the crowds that gather every year in Paris on the occasion of the start of MKO's armed operations, come from? And secondly, where did the approximately 3,000 members in Albania come from? In answer to the first question about the population present at the annual meetings of the MKO in Paris, it should be noted that, firstly, according to the videos and photos broadcast from the official media of the organization, the number of participants is much less than what the MKO officially announced. And secondly, a significant percentage of these people are not Iranians.

Radio Farda (Persian section of Radio Free Europe), which is run by the US Congress, also mentions a Kyrgyz student named Alina Alimkova in a report on the 2013 MEK rally in Paris. This person who has worked with Radio Free Europe for a while, states in an interview with Radio Farda that there are advertisements on the Internet for cheap travel to Paris, which cost only 35 euros - including a round-trip ticket, a week in a 4-star hotel with breakfast. By sending an email to the owner of the advertisement, she realizes that in order to participate in this tour, she only has to participate in a political demonstration and chant Persian slogans. She will board the bus on 21 June 2013 at 9 pm at the Prague Terminal. According to her, the number of buses intended for their transfer from Prague was 8. Most of the passengers were students from Russia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Central Asia, and so on. The Kyrgyz student stated that she did not know Persian and did not know much about Iran. On the bus, when a Russian girl says that she is coming on this trip to defend the rights of Iranian women, someone interrupts her and says: Who cares about Iranian women? She even quotes from a German boy who thought he was coming to this trip for a demonstration for change in Iraq. Finally, when they arrive in France, they find that what they were told before the trip is full of exaggeration. They are transferred to a hotel 60 km from Paris and there is not a good breakfast.⁴⁸

And all this is just a cover to deceive people to participate in the demonstration to say that we have more fans than this, while all this is a lie.

48 the website of Radio Farda <http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f2-iran-mek-rally-foreign-students-tour-paid-paris/25029593.html>



About the population present at the annual meetings of the MKO in Paris, it should be noted that, firstly, according to the videos and photos broadcast from the official media of the organization, the number of participants is much less than what the MKO officially announced. And secondly, a significant percentage of these people are not Iranians.

Senator Goulet, in her book, points to the organization's vast financial resources, which we will address in a later chapter:

"Thanks to these vague and unknown financial sources, the organization can find crowds from other countries for its conferences and gatherings, and thus attracts the opinion of some French personalities and pretends to have the support of a wide range of Iranians opposed to the Iranian regime."⁴⁹

The German edition of Fox magazine also reported in July 2007 that the Mojahedin had asked a German company called "House of Extras" to send crowds for a "glorious" ceremony to be held on March 8, 2007 in Brussels.⁵⁰

49 the book (PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party), Nathalie Goulet, 2013, P9

50 Same, P61



In 2008, one of Poland's largest widely circulated newspapers, *Gazeta Wyborzka*, reported that a group of Iranians from the National Council of Resistance had gone to the university town of Poznan and invited some students to pay only 5 to 6 euros to go to Paris. The Resistance Council will hold a rally on Saturday evening, June 28, and all buses, hotels, and food will be provided for the students who have applied for the trip with the condition that they attend a demonstration on Saturday evening of 28th of June. The number of students attracted in this way reached to 5000. ... The organizers of the rally had told the students that anyone who refused to attend the ceremony had to pay all travel expenses in cash. France 24 television also confirmed the arrival of Polish students in a report on the event.⁵¹

The website "www.ru89.com" also sent a reporter to the ceremony of Villepinte. The site's correspondent reported that some Somalis from London, as well as some Russians and Germans, and a number of African women from the town of Sarsel (a suburb of Paris) had taken part in this demonstration. The organization declared the number of participants at 90,000, but the site's reporter estimated the number at 9,000.⁵²

These are examples of the obvious lies of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq group. June 2010 in the film of the ceremony, there are images of African women who look more like Blacks living in Paris suburbs than Iranian supporters of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization of Iran.⁵³

51 Same, P61

52 Same, P62

53 Same, P62

the website of Iran Resist www.iranresist.org, one of the Mojahedin cover sites, has attacked Ms. Shirin Ebadi and Mr. Abdolkarim Lahiji by mentioning their names, and has not only titled her article "Iran Resists Accused" but also openly declared that:



"Iran Resist site does not give the right to answer for the names mentioned".

Ref: Nathalie Goulet, Book "PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party", page 65

Regarding the second question about recruiting 3,000 MKO members to Albania, a few points should be noted:

First of all, it should be noted that most of the people who gathered at Camp Ashraf in Iraq were either people who were recruited at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution when the organization had a better social base, or the children of members of the organization who are in Iraq who were born there and after being sent to Europe they went under the training of members of the organization and became brainwashed, according to the RAND report.⁵⁴

Of course, these are not all the people who are present in Iraq. After the MKO fled to Iraq and joined Saddam, which led to a sharp decline in its social base, they were no longer able to recruit by telling the truth due to that decline. After Saddam donated Camp Ashraf to the MKO, the group tried to bring some people into Ashraf with tools of pressure and deception.

54 RAND report, 2009, P39

There are some who were captured by Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam had allowed the MKO to go to an Iranian prison camp and release some prisoners from Iraqi prisons in exchange for joining the MKO. They had to join the MKO to escape the harsh conditions of the Iraqi camp for Iranian prisoners.


There are others who were brought to Ashraf with false promises (such as work, residence in Europe, etc.). This is mentioned both in the RAND Institute report and in other Western sources.

The report of RAND Institute states:

"Once it [MEK] settled in Iraq and fought against Iranian forces in alliance with Saddam, the group incurred the ire of the Iranian people and, as a result, faced a shortfall in volunteers. Thus began a campaign of disingenuous recruiting. The MEK naturally sought out Iranian dissidents, but it also approached Iranian economic migrants in such countries as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates with false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq. Relatives of members were given free trips to visit the MEK's camps. Most of these "recruits" were brought into Iraq illegally and then required to hand over their identity documents for "safekeeping." Thus, they were effectively trapped.

Another recruiting tactic was arranged with the assistance of Saddam's government. Iranian prisoners from the Iran-Iraq War were offered the choice of going to MEK camps and being repatriated or remaining in Iraqi prison camps. Hundreds of prisoners went to MEK camps, where they languished.⁵⁵

55 Same, PP38-39

A portrait of Mehdi Khan Baba Tehrani, an elderly man with a mustache, wearing a grey shirt. To his left are several overlapping geometric shapes: a pink triangle, two blue triangles, and a large purple triangle that frames the text below.

Mehdi Khan Baba Tehrani, a representative of the National Left Front for Democracy and Independence, also explained the reason for his party's withdrawal from the NCRI:

"The policy of the NCRI has been to eliminate progressive and national forces and figures instead of recruiting them. The United Left Council within the NCRI is confronted with non-democratic relations and baseless local principles, and here the question arises as to whether we wanted to build the future of a country with those who do not tolerate the slightest opposition?!"

Ref: Rastgoo, Ali, (Mojahedin in the mirror of history), Arnhem, The Netherlands, P346

Another part of this report states:

The MEK leadership employed several deceptive recruitment techniques aimed at a range of Iranian subgroups. With the assistance of Saddam's government, Iranian prisoners from the Iran-Iraq War were offered the choice of remaining in Iraqi prison camps or going to MEK camps where they would have the prospect of repatriation. To recruit potential members still living in Iran, the MEK smuggled family members out of the country to visit relatives at camps in Iraq and then prevented their subsequent departure. Others were victims of fraud in human trafficking: the MEK would arrange for Iranians who paid to be smuggled out of Iran to be redirected to MEK camps in Iraq rather than to their intended destinations. The MEK also targeted Iranians outside of Iran; for example, economic refugees, people with charitable impulses, and MEK family members abroad. Many were enticed not with promises of an opportunity to fight the IRI, but rather through promises of paid employment as translators, assistance in processing asylum requests, free visits to family members, public-health volunteer opportunities, and even marriage.¹¹ All "recruits" were brought into Iraq illegally and then required to hand over their identity documents for "safekeeping", effectively trapping them at MeK compounds.

These findings suggest that many MEK recruits since 1986 were not true volunteers and have been kept at MEK camps in Iraq under duress. As of June 2004, JIATF estimated that, of the MEK population at Camp Ashraf, only 5 percent had joined prior to the Iranian Revolution and 25 percent had joined at the time of the revolution. A full quarter (approximately 1,500 to 1,800) had been POWs, and 45 percent had arrived at Camp Ashraf after the 1988 move to Iraq. Thus, it is possible that nearly 70 percent of the MEK population may have been recruited through deception and kept at Camp Ashraf against their will.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Same, PP73-74

Massoud Rajavi also wrote about his critics in the organization's official publication:

“Hollow Semi alternatives are faced with decadence of personality and telling nonsense, dispersing garbage and have feckless analysis and commentaries about the positions and actions of MEK and NCRI.”



Ref: The book (New Al-Qaeda in Europe), David Gethin, 2012, P110, According to: Mojahed magazine, Number 341, P1&2

Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon adviser and researcher at the American Enterprise Institute states:

"The MKO is a dishonest and creepy sect that is hated by the Iranian people".

Ref: the website of Commentary Magazine

<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/07/07/yes-mujahedin-al-khalq-is-a-dishonest-cult/>

One notable source is an article by US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, James Rubin, published on July 13, 2003, in The New York Times newspaper. The author himself visited Camp Ashraf; he states:

"The Iranian prisoners of war in Iraq had no choice but to stay in the prisons of the Ba'athist regime or to join the Mojahedin... Another method of the organization is to recruit people who went to Turkey and Dubai in looking for jobs' the organization recruits them with false promises of employment and visas and sends them to Iraq.⁵⁷

In the margins of her article, Ms. Rubin refers to the fate of Muhammad, a 19-year-old man who goes to Istanbul in search of work.

"A Mujahedeen recruiter spotted him and a friend sleeping on the streets, so hungry they couldn't think anymore. The recruiter gave them a bed and food for the night, and the next day showed them videos of the Mujahedeen struggle. He enticed them to join with an offer to earn money in Iraq while simultaneously fighting the cruel Iranian regime. What's more, he said, you can marry Mujahedeen girls and start your own family. The Mujahedeen seemed like salvation. Mohammad was told to inform his family that he was going to work in Germany and given an Iraqi passport. The first month at Ashraf, he said, wasn't so bad. Then came the indoctrination in the reception department and the weird self-criticism sessions. He quickly realized there would be no wives, no pay, no communication with his parents, no friendships, no freedom. ... He was subjected to relentless psychological pressure. One night, he couldn't take it anymore. He swallowed 80 diazepam pills. His friend, he said, slit his wrists. The friend died, but to Mohammad's chagrin, he woke up in a solitary room."⁵⁸

57 Elizabeth Rubin, New York Times newspaper, July 7, 2003 <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/13/magazine/13MUJAHADEEN.html?pagewanted=all>

58 Same

A 2009 document from the US Embassy in Baghdad (leaked by WikiLeaks) addresses the remarks of one of those who recently decided to leave. The US embassy confirmed that the MKO kept personal identification documents, such as passports, to prevent its members from leaving. "One man asked for help in retrieving his confiscated papers and other personal documents, including passport and Iranian identification documents, including passport and Iranian identification cards, from Ashraf"⁵⁹

The RAND report states that 70% of Ashraf residents have become members of the Mojahedin in the same ways as mentioned before. As soon as the individuals arrive to the Ashraf, the organization confiscates their passports and other identity cards so that they will not be able to leave Iraq ... Every time anyone asks the officials of the organization what has happened to the documents of the individuals, they are faced with this familiar answer that ... "The documents have been completely destroyed. They destroyed by the bombing."⁶⁰

59 a WikiLeaks document, Line (5) <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09BAGHDAD2521.html>

60 the book (PMOI: How a political cult transformed to a democratic party) Nathalie Goulet, 2013, PP37-38

The BBC presenter also asks such a question: Why did these people join from the beginning? Some say they were given false promises of work and Visas. Others were prisoners of war, the remnants of the Iran-Iraq war handed over to Massoud Rajavi by Saddam Hussein. The rest, perhaps most of them, joined because the Mojahedin represented the best illusion image of hope for Iran.

The point is that if they had the support of the majority, there would be no reason for them to resort to terrorist operations inside Iran, and the most important thing is that MKO has no support not only in Iran but also outside Iran and all of their words, promises and statements are nothing but lies.

